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GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS IN BANK MERGERS:
A POTPOURRI OF ISSUES
MICHAEL

A.

GREENSPAN t

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the ways in which a merger can be anticompetitive is
if it eliminates substantial existing competition between the merging
companies. One step in making that determination is to define the
geographic market(s) in which the companies operate. This Article
analyzes several aspects of defining these geographic markets. Part
II provides a brief overview of the laws, forums and procedures for
analyzing the anticompetitive consequence of mergers, both for
businesses generally, and for bank mergers in particular. Part III
discusses the manner in which the banking agencies and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) determine geographic markets. Part IV
briefly explores a recent development in antitrust; specifically, the
unilateral effects analysis that some claim does away with the need to
determine the appropriate geographic market. Finally, Part V notes
that Congress allowed a slightly more expansive standard for bank
mergers, permitting them to be consummated if the convenience and
needs of the community clearly outweigh the anticompetitive effect.
Part V then asks if the merging banks can offset positive convenience
and needs factors in geographic market A against anticompetitive
effects in market B.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF MERGERS

The United States places great, but not total, reliance on the
free market system to allocate resources fairly and wisely (or at least
in accordance with the desires of its citizens). Many people believe,
however, that left to their own devices markets will tend to
t Partner, Thompson Coburn, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1962, Cornell University;
LL.B., 1965, Columbia University. Mr. Greenspan would like to thank Adam H. Gordon,
an associate in the office, for his valuable assistance with this Article.
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monopolize (the presence of a single supplier of a product or
service). To stop this monopolization, the antitrust laws are intended
to prevent anticompetitive acquisitions. In theory, those who believe
most vigorously in "free market" solutions and who are most
strenuously opposed to government intervention in the market,
should be most in favor of strong antitrust laws to insure that free
markets exist.
Companies cannot merge' if their transaction is proved to
violate any of three antitrust laws: Section 1 or section 2 of the
Sherman Act2 or section 7 of the Clayton Act.3 These laws are
equally applicable to bank mergers, although the forums, procedures,
and defenses applicable to the mergers are adjusted to take into
account that banking is a highly regulated industry.4
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."5 Section 2 of that Act
prohibits unilateral monopolization and attempted monopolization,
as well as monopolization by combination or conspiracy.
Specifically, it provides that "[e]very person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony ....
p6 Finally, section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers
or acquisitions "in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, [where] the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly."7

1. For simplicity, I define a "merger" as any transaction through which a company
acquires control of all or any part of the assets of another.
2. Section 1 is found at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); section 2 is found at 15 U.S.C. § 2.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 18.

4. There is a fourth law that is applicable to mergers generally, but which is not
applicable to bank mergers. The Federal Trade Commission may challenge a merger or

acquisition as a violation of section 5 of the Trade Commission Act which, in relevant part,
prohibits "unfair methods of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
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When a transaction is between nonbanking companies and it
meets various size criteria, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act) requires that the merging
parties give information about the transaction to the DOJ and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).' These two federal antitrust
agencies decide between themselves which agency will pursue the
transaction.
Thereafter, that agency may solicit additional
information from the merging companies, and should the agency
view be negative, it will attempt to work with the parties to fashion
an acquisition that the agency believes is not anticompetitive.
Failing that, the agency will challenge the transaction in a federal
district court as being a violation of one of the three antitrust laws
previously mentioned.
Early case law stated that section 7 of the Clayton Act was
intended to reach incipient anticompetitive effects not reached by
section 1 of the Sherman Act.9 More recent cases have suggested,
however, that judicial interpretations of the two acts have
converged. 10 In any event, currently either section 7 is the easier
standard to establish or it is the same standard as in section 1. Either
way, the DOJ and the FTC almost always attempt to establish the
standard of section 7 when challenging mergers.
Banking is among the more regulated industries in this
country. Individual banks have "primary federal regulators,"" and
companies that control them are subject to additional regulation by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed). Those
regulators have the responsibility to insure the safety and soundness
of institutions under their purview by examining them, by passing
rules and regulations, and by reviewing'certain transactions in which
they propose to engage.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
9. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1964).
10. See United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1282-83 (7th Cir.).
11. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a part of the Treasury
Department, supervises federally chartered banks (called national banks). The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) is the federal supervisor of state chartered
banks that choose to join the Federal Reserve System; the Fed shares supervisory authority
with the state Banking Commissioner. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
is the primary federal supervisor of state chartered banks with federally insured deposits
that do not choose to join the Federal Reserve System; here again, the FDIC shares
supervisory responsibilities with the state Banking Commissioner.
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Regarding the regulators' role in reviewing proposed
transactions, the Bank Merger Act' 2 requires that a federal bank
regulator give its prior approval before any bank with federally
insured deposits may merge with another. In addition, the Bank
Holding Company Act 3 requires the Fed to give its prior approval
before a bank holding company may acquire a bank. At the time
Congress imposed these requirements, it considered whether a
review of the competitive consequences of the merger should be
performed by the antitrust agencies (the DOJ or FTC) or the banking
agencies (the OCC, Fed or the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC)). It decided that both the antitrust agencies and
the banking agencies should perform a review.
In a bank merger or bank holding company acquisition of a
bank, the HSR Act does not apply. 4 Instead, the applicant files
information about the transaction, including its competitive
consequences, with the appropriate banking agency. 5 The agency
gives a copy of the application to the DOJ and requests its views on
the competitive consequences of the merger. If, despite the DOJ's
negative comments, the agency approves the transaction, the DOJ
has thirty days in which to challenge the transaction as being a
violation of the antitrust laws. If the DOJ challenges the transaction,
the DOJ receives: (1) a de novo review of the transaction; and (2) an
automatic stay of its consummation. In such a challenge, review of
the agency decision uses the same slightly modified standard for
bank mergers that the agency itself used.
With some differences that are discussed in Part V, the Bank
Holding Company Act and the Bank Merger Act incorporate sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act. 6 The
12. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1994).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1842.
14. The procedures for review of the transaction by the antitrust agencies are contained
in the banking statutes. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994). The HSR Act does not apply to
the acquisition of a bank. See id.
15. When a bank is acquiring federally insured deposits, the applicable agency is the
primary federal regulator of the resulting bank. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2). When a bank

is acquiring non-insured deposits, the FDIC reviews the transaction, even if the surviving
bank is supervised by the OCC or the Fed. See id. § 1828(c)(2)(C). When a bank holding
company is acquiring a bank, the Fed reviews the transaction. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a).
16. Section 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act provides:
The Board shall not approve-(A) any acquisition or merger or
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courts have determined that the Fed can deny an application by a
bank holding company on competitive grounds only ifthe transaction
violates those laws. 7 Presumably, this also is true for the Bank
Merger Act, which contains the identical statutory standard.
Under section 7 of the Clayton Act, section 1 of the Sherman
Act, and the banking statutes covering acquisitions, there is a five
step method of analysis that is uniformly employed by the banking
agencies, the antitrust agencies and the courts. The five questions
are: (1) what is the relevant product market(s) in which to assess the
competitive consequences of the merger;"8 (2) in what geographic
market(s) do the merging parties offer the product(s); (3) what is the
impact of the merger on competition in the relevant product and
geographic markets;19 (4) are there any offsetting factors;2" and (5)
consolidation under this section which would result in a monopoly, or
which would be in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to
monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the business of banking in any
part of the United States, or (B) any other proposed acquisition or
merger or consolidation under this section whose effect in any section
of the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in restraint
of trade, unless itfinds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed
transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the
probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs
of the community to be served.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (emphasis added). The italicized language is not in the Clayton Act
but is unique to bank mergers. The standard in the Bank Merger Act is identical. See 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B).
17. See County Nat'l Bancorp. v. Board of Governors, 654 F.2d 1253, 1260 (8th Cir.
1981); Mercantile Tex. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 638 F.2d 1255, 1260-63 (5th Cir.
1981).
18. The banking agencies conclude that the relevant product market is the cluster of
services known as commercial banking, while the DOJ disaggregates this market into its
constituent parts. In First Union Corporation's application to acquire Signet Banking
Corporation, the Fed specifically rejected a protestant's request that the Board disaggregate
the cluster and focus on a small business lending market. See First Union Corp., 83 Fed.
Res. Bull. 1012 (1997).
19. The banking agencies assume that a transaction that unduly concentrates the market
will have an adverse effect on the market's performance. The impact of the transaction on
the structure of the market is determined by constructing a Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index
(HHI) for the market before and after the acquisition. The HHI is calculated by summing
the squares of the market shares of the participants in the market. Thus, the acquisition in a
3 firm market of a competitor with a 10% share by one with a 50% share is described as an
increase in the HHI by 1000 points to 5200 points ((the post-merger HHI: 60 squared + 40
squared) - (the pre-merger HHI: 50 squared + 40 squared + 10 squared)). Calculation of
market share is beyond the scope of this Article. For a general understanding of the
Supreme Court's approach to defining market share, see United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 331, 364-65 (1963). The 1992 Merger Guidelines dictate an inquiry
that is "fact-intensive," a methodology that "requires a thorough economic analysis of the
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are the solutions that the parties offer to eliminate any
anticompetitive effect acceptable? 2
While these steps in the antitrust analysis of mergers have
stayed constant, the amount of resources devoted to each has varied.
In 1963 for example, the Supreme Court placed its major emphasis
on the strong presumption that structure determines performance
when determining how the merger would affect competition (i.e., it
devoted virtually all of its attention to the first three questions). Over
time, however, there has been an increasing emphasis on the fourth
question, so that present analysis places increasing emphasis on how
a market does and is likely to perform after the merger.22
While the attention to be paid to the fourth question has
changed over time, the attention paid to the second question has
remained constant. In Part III, I summarize how the banking
agencies and the DOJ define the relevant geographic market. While
all of the agencies agree that the determination of this area is the
second step in the analysis, each of them uses slightly different
approaches to making its assessment.

III. How THE BANKING AND ANTITRUST AGENCIES DEFINE
GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS

A.

Overview

In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,23 the
Supreme Court determined that section 7 of the Clayton Act applied
facts and market conditions in the specific markets at issue." Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert &
Janusz A. Ordover, The 1992 Agency HorizontalMerger Guidelinesand the Department of
Justice's Approach to Bank Merger Analysis, 37 ANTITRuST BULL. 667, 673 (1992). The
Guidelines state that "[m]arket shares will be calculated using the best indicator of firm's
future competitive significance." 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552

§ 1.41 (1992).
20. For example, the market might be very attractive for entry, or the market might not
be able to efficiently support the existing number of banks.
21. Since 1982, both the banking agencies and the DOJ accept the divestiture of an
appropriate number of offices to an appropriate buyer as curing an antitrust problem. See
Kolasky & Seidman, DOJ Suggests Merger Parties ConsiderAll Options, LEGAL TIMES,
July 12, 1982, at 18.
22. See Kolasky & Lowe, The Merger Review Process and the Federal Trade
Commission: Administrative Efficiency and the Rule of Law, 49 ADMIN. L. REv., 889, 898-

901 (Fall 1997).
23. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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to bank mergers.'
One way in which a merger could be
anticompetitive is by eliminating a substantial amount of actual
competition between the merging parties (this is called a "horizontal
merger")." A crucial step in that analysis is to define the geographic
market(s) in which the merging parties compete. To determine such
a geographic market, the Court stated that "[t]he proper question to
be asked in this case is not where the parties to the merger do
business or even where they compete, but where, within the area of
competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will be
direct and immediate. 26
This language-the area of "direct and immediate"
competition-is subject to several different interpretations. The
"service area" approach focuses on any overlap in the area(s) within
which the banks obtain their business. The "alternatives for
customers" approach focuses on any overlap in the area within which
the customers of each bank can look for alternative sources of
supply. Finally, the "economic market" definition looks for the area
within which economic forces are transmitted freely.
These alternative interpretations can lead to differing
geographic markets and differing conclusions as to the competitive
consequences of a merger. For example, assume that: (1) the
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area is made up of the city itself and
the suburbs in southern Maryland and northern Virginia; (2) residents
of southern Maryland never go to Virginia but substantial numbers of
them commute to the central city; and (3) residents of northern

24. This was considered to be a surprising result at the time because the language of the
statute applied only to asset acquisitions by a corporation that was subject to the jurisdiction
of the FTC. See id. Banks are not subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC.
25. The Supreme Court has stated that a transaction could violate section 7 even if it
did not eliminate substantial actual competition between the parties. One of the two
theories would be if the merger would eliminate a competitor who, though not in the
market, was presently affecting the competitive conduct of the acquirer. See United States
v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). The other theory is if the merger would
foreclose the probability that substantial competition might develop between the merging
parties in the future. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602
(1974); United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974). While the
possibility exists that the government could win a case that does not involve the elimination

of actual competition, the requirements for establishing such a case are exceptionally
difficult to establish. Accordingly, an applicant invariably wins today if its merger will not
eliminate substantial existing competition between the parties.
26. PhiladelphiaNat 7 Bank, 374 U.S. at 357.
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Virginia never go to Maryland but substantial numbers of them
commute to the central city.
Now consider several merger scenarios. In scenario A,
suppose that two banks in northern Virginia want to merge. The
service area theory would focus on northern Virginia since that is the
area in which both banks do business. The customer alternatives
theory would focus on northern Virginia and Washington, D.C.,
because, in addition to looking in northern Virginia, a substantial
number of customers have the choice of banking in Washington,
D.C. The economic markets theory would focus on all three areas
because all three areas are tied together.27
In scenario B, suppose that a bank in northern Virginia
wishes to merge with a bank in Maryland. Under the service area
approach, there would be no geographic market in which the two
banks compete for business since neither bank does business in the
area in which the other competes. Under the economic markets
approach, all three areas together would constitute the geographic
market since the areas, as explained above, are tied together
economically. Under the customer alternatives approach, the market
also would be all three areas since customers of the merging banks
would have sources for loans in all three areas.
It is interesting that an applicant sometimes argues for a
smaller market and sometimes for a larger one. On the one hand, an
applicant will prefer a smaller market if that results in the acquirer
and the target being in different markets. 8 On the other hand, if the
acquirer and the target are in the same geographic market, it is
generally helpful to the applicant that the market be as large as
possible.
Having the market as large as possible generally
maximizes the number of competitors and minimizes the competitive
consequences of the proposed merger.

27. Suppose, for example, that the Maryland bank eliminated service charges on
checking accounts. The city bank would have to react because a large number of customers

have the choice of banking in Maryland or the city which would cause the Virginia bank to
eliminate service charges for the same reason. In other words, economic forces flow freely

throughout the three areas, which is the economists' definition of a market.
28. It is very difficult for the government to prevail if the merger does not eliminate
substantial actual competition between the parties. See supranote 25.
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With this background, I will briefly discuss how the Fed, the
OCC, the FDIC, and the DOJ define the relevant geographic market
in which to assess the competitive consequences of a bank merger.
B.

The Fed'sApproach to Defining GeographicMarkets

The Fed clearly falls into the "economic market" camp. The
twelve Federal Reserve Banks, which in a sense are regional offices
of the Fed, have predefined banking markets over the entire country.
In general, these markets remain unchanged regardless of the banks
that are merging and the services they offer.29 For example, in our
hypothetical merger discussed above, all of the banks in Washington,
D.C., northern Virginia, and southern Maryland are part of the
Washington, D.C. banking market regardless of the location of the
merging banks within that area.
In defining these markets, the Federal Reserve Banks look for
"worker commuting patterns (as indicated by census data) and other
indicia of economic integration and transmission of competitive
forces among depository institutions."3 This data includes shopping
data and surveys of bankers, consumers, and owners of small
businesses."
The Fed will exclude some data of economic
integration in order to focus on data showing competition for
banking services.32 Oftentimes the Fed's markets coincide with those
defined in the Rand-McNally Commercial Atlas (these areas around

29. As noted, the Fed defines the relevant product market as the cluster of services
known as commercial banking, and they draw the relevant market to fit this product. On
rare occasions (generally in response to protests) the Fed considers whether a merger would
have a different competitive impact if the product market were different. Obviously the
geographic market can change with changes in the product market. The Fed, however, has
never decided an application based on these different product markets.
30. First Union Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 1012 (1997).
31. See BancSecurity Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 122 (1997).
32. In the BancSecurity order, the Fed stated that "BancSecurity maintains that the
designation of Tama and Marshall Counties as a Rand-McNally basic trade area and the
overlap of school district boundaries between the counties, among other things, support its
contention that the relevant banking market should be larger. The Board notes that these
delineations are made for purposes not related to the competitive overlap between
depository institutions and the facts of this case, including those noted above, indicate that

these delineations do not adequately reflect the area in which competition for banking
services is real and immediate." See id.

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 2

cities are defined based on economic integration and are known as
Rand-McNally Areas (RMAs)).
To summarize, the Fed predefmes economic markets based
on evidence that shows the area within which economic forces on
banks are uniformly transmitted. An applicant can submit evidence
justifying a different "economic market," but the Fed rarely changes
the definition.33
C.

The DOJ'sApproach to Defining GeographicMarkets

The DOJ and the FTC have promulgated a document that
describes the methodology used by both when analyzing the
competitive consequences of mergers and acquisitions.
The
34
document, known as the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
describes the analysis used for both bank and nonbank mergers.
Section 1.2 describes the methodology that the agencies use in
defining the relevant geographic market.
In essence, the
methodology is aimed at finding the geographic area in which a
hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a "small but
significant and nontransitory" increase in price (generally five
percent in one year). The DOJ (and the FTC) start with the area in
which the service areas of the merging parties overlap, if any, and
determine whether a monopolist in that area could raise prices with
impunity. If it could not, it must be because the monopolist in that
small area would face competition from organizations located in a
somewhat broader area. By continually expanding the geographic
market until it includes all organizations that, in fact, compete in an
area, the DOJ ends up with a geographic market that is, or that
approximates, the economic market.
However, there is, or may be, one significant difference
between the economic markets that the Fed and the DOJ define. The
geographic market is intimately related to the product market
because it looks for the area where competitionfor that product will
be affected by the merger. As far as the banking agencies are
33. One case in which the Fed changed the market was a case on which the author
prepared the application for reconsideration. See Hawkeye Bancorporation, 64 Fed. Res.
Bull. 974 (1978).
34. 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992).
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concerned, the relevant product market for a bank merger is the
cluster of services known as commercial banking. The DOJ, on the
other hand, has disaggregated the cluster into several constituent
parts. The DOJ starts by considering a separate product market for
retail banking services and commercial banking services. However,
the DOJ will refine its product market to take account of the actual
product that the merging banks and the others in the local area offer.
To date, the DOJ has never concerned itself with the impact
of a transaction on the retail product market." It has, however,
looked closely at a market for loans to middle market companies; and
has looked at a market for small business loans, for unsecured small
business loans, and for those companies that offer the cluster of
services required by small businesses. Note that the only time the
DOJ has litigated its disaggregated market definition, the distinct
court rejected that definition in favor of a definition based on the
cluster of services offered by commercial banks.36
The DOJ's disaggregation of the relevant product market can
have a direct impact on the relevant geographic market. The purpose
of geographic maret definition is to define the potential customers
of the merging parties that could be affected by the merger. The DOJ
has concluded that small businesses are locally limited in their credit
sources. Accordingly, when the DOJ focuses on some aspect of the
small business market, it sometimes finds the relevant geographic
market to be much smaller than the Fed's market, which is based on
the cluster of commercial banking services as the relevant product
market.
This often has a remarkable impact on the result of the
analysis. When two banks are located in the same geographic
market, and that market is made smaller, the effect of the merger
generally is to reduce the number of competitors and increase the
effect of the merger on competition. A good example is the 1992

35. As noted, the Fed does not disaggregate the cluster into its constituent parts. Steve
Rhoades, the chief of the Fed's banking markets section, however, has said that if the Fed
were to disaggregate, he would urge it to focus on the competitive consequences of the
merger in the retail banking market. Despite the presence of countless credit card offers and
of electronic banking, he believes that there is a correlation in the retail market between a
small number of local banks and high prices.
36. United States v. Central State Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Mich. 1985), aff'd,
817 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987).
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merger of Society Corporation with Ameritrust Corporation. The
Fed approved the application after examining its impact on ten Ohio
markets, including the Cleveland market. While the Fed required
significant divestitures in several markets, it found that none were
required in the Cleveland market, which the Fed defined to include
all or parts of eight counties in the Cleveland metropolitan area.37
The DOJ focused on the small business loan market, finding that
these borrowers were limited in the places from which they could
obtain these loans. Accordingly, the DOJ did not have a "Cleveland
market," and defined geographic markets on a county-by-county
basis. The DOJ found significant anticompetitive effects in two of
the Fed's eight counties, and required divestitures in those markets.3"
The banking industry has been unwilling to challenge the
DOJ when it finds anticompetitive effects based on the disaggregated
product market and the smaller geographic market that such a
product market sometimes implies. The simple fact is that in all of
the transactions to date, the divestiture of a few additional offices
constituting a small percentage of the assets being acquired has been
sufficient to assuage the DOJ.
As a general matter, however, the industry continues to
believe that the mergers to which the DOJ objects should be
permitted. The industry's two main theories are that there are many
nonbank alternatives for banking services and that small businesses
are not as locally limited as the DOJ asserts. In that regard, recent
evidence collected by the Fed's staff both supports and undercuts the
industry's contention that small businesses are not locally limited.39
On the one hand, the evidence shows that a substantial number of
out-of-market lenders are making loans to local businesses. On the
other hand, that evidence also shows that, on average at the present
time, the percent of each organization's borrowing from out-ofmarket lenders is only a small percentage of its total borrowing.

37. Society Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 302 (1992).
38. 57 Fed. Reg. 10,371, 10,380 (Dep't Justice 1992).
39. See Division of Research & Statistics, Federal Reserve Board, New Information on
Lending to Small Businesses and Small Firms: The 1996 CRA Data, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 1

(1998).
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The OCC's Approach to Defining GeographicMarkets

The OCC has concluded that, as a general matter, mergers are
efficiency-enhancing methods of increasing benefits to consumers.
Accordingly, the OCC will approve virtually all mergers that the
DOJ clears. Two commonly cited examples of the OCC's liberality
are its willingness to use any geographic markets definition that
permits the merger, and its use of a de minimis theory to approve
certain mergers that appear on the surface to be anticompetitive.
There is no published support for the first proposition. There
is substantial evidence that the OCC considers the service areas of
the merging banks as well as the Fed's "economic market". 4 °
However, the OCC staff has confirmed that there is no case in which
the OCC has had to rely on the service area definition to the
exclusion of the Fed definition." In all cases in which there have
been substantial anticompetitive effects in the Fed-defined market,
the OCC has found some alternative method of justifying its
approval.
Nevertheless, the view persists among experienced
practitioners that the OCC would use the service area approach to
define the relevant market if that were the only method for that
agency to approve the transaction.
There is, however, substantial evidence for the OCC's de
minimis theory. The seminal case is the 1983 merger of National
Bank of Oxford into the National Bank and Trust Company of
Norwich. In that case, the OCC approved the merger on the theory
that the relevant geographic market was too small to be a "section of
the country." There is no exact statement of the rule. It certainly
applies when the population of the county is approximately 10,000 or
less. It also may apply when the population of the county exceeds
that number but the population of the town in which the target bank
is located is small.

40. In Application ofZions FirstNat 7 Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah, Corp. Decis. #97-82
(Sept. 1997), the OCC stated that "[i]n defining the geographic markets, the OCC
considered the Federal Reserve bank of San Francisco's market delineations, as well as
evidence of the areas from which the involved banks derive the bulk of their deposits." Id.
at n.2.
41. Telephone interview with Mitchell Mertins, OCC staff, in Washington, D.C.
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It is unclear whether the OCC's conclusion is based on its
interpretation of the Bank Merger Act,42 or whether it is based on the
assumption that the DOJ is unlikely to "waste" resources challenging
a merger so small. Regardless, it appears that the OCC will approve
such mergers, while the other agencies will not.
E.

The FDIC'sApproach to Defining GeographicMarkets

The FDIC's views on the competitive analysis of merger
transactions are contained in a 1989 policy statement. 3 While the
FDIC recently has proposed to update that statement," its position on
geographic market determination is the same in both statements:
The relevant geographic market(s) includes the areas
in which the offices to be acquired are located and the
areas from which those offices derive the predominant
portion of their loans, deposits, or other business. The
relevant geographic market also includes the areas
where existing and potential customers impacted by
the proposed merger may practically turn for
alternative sources of banking services. In delineating
the relevant geographic market, the FDIC will also
consider the location of the acquiring institution's
offices in relation to the offices to be acquired.45
The FDIC's Policy Statement suggests an approach that is
part "service area" based and part "customer alternatives" based. In
actuality, the FDIC seems to be responsive to applicants' arguments
as to the relevant market, sometimes accepting the Fed's "economics
42. The OCC cited cases such as Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962), and Pargas,Inc. v. Empire Gas, 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md. 1975), affd, 546 F.2d
25 (4th Cir. 1976). In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court considered the legislative history of
the Clayton Act and concluded that it was intended to apply in "economically significant"
areas. In Pargas,the Court held that markets in that case with more than 10,000 people
were economically significant. These cases suggest that there is a market that would be too
small to be recognized as a relevant geographic market. However, there is no case in which
a court has supported the theory, and in United States v. County Nat ' Bank of Bennington,
339 F. Supp. 85 (D. Vt. 1972), the district court rejected the OCC's claim that a market of
24,000 people was too small to be cognizable as a market. See United States v. American
Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975) (distinguishing County Nat ' Bank).
43. See Statement of Policy; Bank Merger Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,043 (1989).
44. See Meeting Notice, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,877 (FDIC 1997).
45. Id.at 52,879.
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markets" definition as well. There are two major points about the
FDIC's approach. First, unlike the Fed, the FDIC determines the
market in relation to the banks that are merging (while the Fed
predefines markets for all mergers). Second, since the FDIC has not
invested significant resources in market definition (or pre-definition),
the FDIC is more willing than the Fed to modify its market definition
in response to information that the applicant submits.
IV.

UNILATERAL EFFECTS ANALYSIS

Previously I stated that there is a five step analysis used by
the antitrust and banking agencies. The five questions are: (1) what
is the relevant product market(s) in which to assess the competitive
consequences of the merger; (2) in what geographic market(s) do the
merging parties offer this product(s); (3) what is the impact of the
merger on competition in the relevant product and geographic
markets; (4) are there any offsetting factors; and (5) are the solutions
that the parties offer to eliminate any anticompetitive effect
acceptable?
This is certainly true as far as the banking agencies are
concerned. These agencies note that the economic research that
correlates concentration with higher prices, and in step three, they go
directly from the fact that a merger will increase concentration to a
presumption that the market will operate in an anticompetitive
manner. The DOJ, however, is a litigating agency, and has
concluded that it cannot simply take "administrative notice" of the
correlation between concentration and prices, but must have a theory
why the correlation occurs. In the Merger Guidelines, it offered two
explanations: (1) increases in concentration could increase the
possibility of collusion between the smaller number of remaining
competitors, and (2) concentration might have an impact on
performance even in the absence of collusion. This second
"explanation" of why a merger that increases concentration is illegal
has come to be known as "unilateral effects" analysis.
In the early years of the Guidelines, unilateral effects did not
receive much attention. In the last two or three years, however, the
search for these effects has come to dominate discussions with the
antitrust agencies. This is important to this Article because under
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one such form of unilateral effects analysis it is claimed that it is not
necessary to define the relevant geographic market. The DOJ is not
currently using unilateral effects analysis in analyzing bank mergers.
However, I am including a brief description of the theory for two
reasons. First, it is very much on the cutting edge of antitrust.
Second, since it is evolving so rapidly, there is at least a possibility
that the DOJ could use it in analyzing bank mergers in the future.
There were six articles on unilateral effects analysis in the
Spring 1997 issue of Antitrust Magazine. These articles explain that
under this analysis, the antitrust agencies try to directly predict what
will happen to the prices of products sold by the merging companies
rather than, or as well as, determining the relevant product and
geographic market, and market shares, etc. In one version of
unilateral effects analysis that may or may not be limited to sellers of
"differentiated" products, the agencies try to calculate the impact of a
merger on prices by calculating the elasticity of supply and demand
functions for the merging companies. In the case of products sold in
supermarkets, these functions can be calculated (or approximated) by
analysis of scanner data.
The approach undertaken by this kind of analysis is to find if
there is a class of customer who will choose only between a product
sold by each of the merging firms. After the merger, that class of
customer will be at the mercy of the survivor, since the customer will
have no other alternative. In what seems to be magic to the
nonmathematically inclined layman, economists claim to be able to
calculate (given enough of the right kind of data) how many people
would be negatively impacted in this way by the merger and how
much the price could rise with respect to them.
Of course there are economists and lawyers who find this
information less than persuasive. Among other problems, it may be
that one chooses between Cornflakes and Raisin Bran each morning.
But it is also true that if those companies merge and try to raise the
price of Raisin Bran significantly, one may be more than willing to
try some entirely different cereal.
Thus far, the unilateral effects analysis has played no role in
analyzing the anticompetitive effects of bank mergers. Were it to
become the dominant view, however, its proponents claim that it
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would do away with the determination of markets and market shares

that have formed the backbone of antitrust analysis to date.
V. CAN POSITIVE EFFECTS IN ONE MARKET OFFSET
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS IN ANOTHER?

Although an acquisition violates the antitrust laws, courts will
permit the acquisition of a commercial organization if the target is a
"failing company" and if there are no less anticompetitive solutions
to the failing company's problems. 6 This idea was incorporated into
the banking statutes in an expanded form. The Bank Holding
Company Act and the Bank Merger Act provide that any proposed
merger transaction which substantially lessens competition shall not
be approved by the responsible banking agency unless it finds that
the anticompetitive effects are clearly outweighed in the public
interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the
convenience and needs of the community to be served. This has
come to be known as the "convenience and needs" defense.
The legislative history of the "convenience and needs"
defense makes clear that Congress intended it to be an expansion of
the "failing company doctrine," available where the target is merely
stagnant or floundering, rather than actually failing. 7 Because it is
based on the failing company defense, however, when a banking
agency has approved a transaction on convenience and needs
grounds, it generally has stated that there were no less
anticompetitive solutions to the bank's problems.48 There may be at
least one case, however, in which the Fed approved a transaction that
it viewed as anticompetitive and the order approving the merger does
not indicate the absence of alternative solutions. 9
46. See, e.g., G.K.A. Beverage Corp. et at. v. Honickman, 55 F.3d 762, 765 (2d Cir.
1995); see also H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949); 4 Phillip Areeda &
Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law §§ 924-931 (1978).
47. See United States v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 280 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1968); United
States v. First City Nat'l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361 (1967).
48. See First Nat'l Bankshares of Sheridan, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 832 (1984); see also
United States v. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171, 189 (1968).
49. See First of America Bank Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 516 (1984). The Order states
that the Board is approving the application because "significant benefits to the convenience
and needs of the community that would result from this transaction outweigh the
anticompetitive effects of [the] proposal," and "[t]he Board has determined that
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There is an interesting aspect of the "convenience and needs"
defense that is relevant to the present article. The Supreme Court has
held that:
It is settled that courts should give weight to any
reasonable construction of a regulatory statute
adopted by the agency charged with enforcement of
that statute. [A banking agency] is charged with the
enforcement of banking laws to an extent that
warrants the invocation of this principle with respect
to [its] deliberate conclusions as to the meaning of
these laws. 0
This is especially true in the recent past when the Supreme Court has
given great deference to the reasonable constructions by the OCC of
5
statutes within the scope of its authority. 1
Assume that: (1) Bank A and Bank B are national banks that
compete in geographic markets 1-10; (2) the merger of these banks
would violate the antitrust laws in market 1; (3) there are positive
"convenience and needs" factors in markets 2-10; and (4) the only
way to achieve those benefits is through the merger of Banks A and
B. Assume further that: (5) the OCC approves the merger arguing
that the "convenience and needs" considerations in markets 2-10
clearly outweigh the violation of the antitrust laws in market 1; and
(6) the DOJ files suit to block the transaction. The question is
whether a court should give deference to the OCC's determination
and support if it is at all reasonable.
There are two preliminary matters to be addressed. First, the
Supreme Court has given deference to an agency that has sole
consummation of the proposal is consistent with the public interest ...and should be
approved." Id. at 517. However the statutory scheme permits the Board to deny on
competitive grounds only if the transaction violates the antitrust laws and it permits the

Board to approve of a transaction that violates the antitrust laws only if the Board finds that
the anticompetitive effect is "clearly outweighed." Perhaps the best way to understand the
case is to assume, despite the anticompetitive language, that the Board never decided that
the anticompetitive effect was enough to violate the antitrust laws. If so, there is no need
for the convenience and needs effects to "clearly outweigh" the anticompetitive effect.
50. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1987). It is unclear
whether this deference is of the sort that the Supreme Court established in Chevron USA,
Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
51. See Smiley v. Citibank, 116 S.Ct. 1730 (1996); Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 517

U.S. 25 (1996); Nationsbank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. 513
U.S. 251 (1995).
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responsibility for interpreting a statute. The OCC, however, shares
interpretation of the Bank Merger Act with the two other banking
agencies - the FDIC and the Fed. Each has exclusive authority with
regardto institutions under their control. While I can point to no
precedent, I see no inherent problem with courts upholding a view of
the OCC as to national bank mergers that is directly contrary to the
view of the Fed as to state member bank mergers, as long as both
agencies have a reasonable amount of support for their position. To
decide otherwise would be to deny one of the banking agencies the
deference to which its reasoned conclusion is entitled.
Second, the OCC shares enforcement of the statute, not only
with other banking agencies, but with the DOJ as well. Since the
issue would arise only if the DOJ was challenging a merger in court,
it might be argued that the OCC's promerger interpretation would be
offset by the DOJ's antimerger interpretation. However, deference is
due to agencies that regulate industries. The OCC is entitled to that
deference. The DOJ is a litigating agency. As such, its construction
should be entitled to no deference. While, again, I can point to no
precedent, I believe that the courts should give weight to the OCC's
interpretation if it is reasonable.
Thus, it is at least relatively clear that courts should defer to a
reasonable interpretation by the OCC that preceded the court case. It
is less clear, however, that the OCC has the discretion to interpret a
statute in a manner contrary to the way the courts have already
interpreted it. The Supreme Court previously considered the statute
and, at least in one context, has decided that a reviewing agency may
not offset a positive convenience and needs effect in one market
against an anticompetitive effect in another.12 Accordingly, an
extended discussion of that case is necessary to understand its limits.
In United States v. PhillipsburgNational Bank, the OCC had
approved the merger of Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust Co.
and the Second National Bank of Phillipsburg.53 Both banks were
located in Phillipsburg, New Jersey. The OCC based its approval on
the lack of anticompetitive effect in the four counties surrounding the
towns of Phillipsburg and Easton. The district court accepted the

52. See United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
53. 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
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OCC's geographic market definition which involved an area with
216,000 people and eighteen banks. However, the Supreme Court
overturned it in favor of the two towns themselves which had a total
population of 90,000.
The Supreme Court criticized the district court's application
of the convenience and needs standard. The Supreme Court stated
that the district court had assessed "the competitive effect of the
proposed merger in the broad, multi-community area that it adopted
as the relevant geographic market, while assessing the merger's
contribution to community convenience and needs in Phillipsburg
alone." 4 The Court added that the geographic market is the area in
which convenience and needs must be evaluated:
Under the approach taken by the District Court,
anticompetitive effects in some parts of a relevant
geographic market could be justified by community
benefits in other parts of it. Such a result would
subvert the clear congressional purpose in the Bank
Merger Act that convenience and needs not be
assessed in only a part of the community to be served,
and such a result would unfairly deny the benefits of
the merger to some of those who sustain its direct and
immediate effects."
Thus, the Court held that it is improper to offset convenience
and needs benefits in the four county area against anticompetitive
effects in the much smaller Phillipsburg-Easton market contained
within it. Would this precedent prevent the OCC or the other
banking agencies from approving a merger in all circumstances in
which the offsetting benefits partly come from other geographic
markets?
There are two arguments that the OCC might advance. First,
it has been nearly thirty years since the Phillipsburgcase. Banking
has changed substantially (particularly with respect to the crumbling
of geographic barriers), and Congress has established banking
agencies to monitor those changes. It is their job to keep the industry

54. Id. at 370.
55. Id. at 371-72.
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modem providing there is enough ambiguity in the statute to permit
flexibility of interpretation. 6
Thus, in Smiley v. Citibank,"7 the Supreme Court affirmed the
responsibility and authority of the agencies to change their
interpretations of statutes they administer as developments in the
industry occur. The Court stated:
Finally, petitioner argues that the regulation is not
entitled to deference because it is inconsistent with
positions taken by the Comptroller in the past. Of
course the mere fact that an agency interpretation
contradicts a prior agency position is not fatal.
Sudden and unexplained change [citations omitted], or
change that does not take into account legitimate
reliance on prior interpretations [citations omitted],
may be "arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of
discretion". 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). But if these
pitfalls are avoided, change is not invalidating since
the whole point of Chevron [U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 US. 837
(1984)] is to leave the discretion provided by the
ambiguities of a statute with an implementing
58
agency.
The second argument (obviously dependent on the facts of
the case) is that the decline of geographic barriers now permits
mergers whose anticompetitive effect is minimal compared to the
large number of people that would be benefited by consummation.
This is a difference, the argument would go, in kind rather than in
degree.
Consider that in the Phillipsburg case the Supreme Court
refused to allow benefits to 90,000 people to outweigh disadvantages
to 125,000 others. Contrast this with a transaction such as the
acquisition by Fleet Financial Group, Inc. of the assets of the failed
Bank of New England from the FDIC. Fleet was the winning bidder
over Bank of America. The DOJ objected to the transaction on the
56. Language that convenience and needs factors must do their offsetting in the
community that the merging bank serves, certainly is subject to multiple interpretations.
57. 116S. Ct. 1730 (1996).
58. Id. 517 U.S. at 1734 (emphasis added).
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grounds of its anticompetitive effects in the Bangor, Pittsfield, and
Presque Isle-Caribou markets in Maine.
The Fed approved this transaction on the grounds that there
were no anticompetitive effects in the three markets claimed. "
Suppose, however, that the Fed agreed that the transaction was
anticompetitive in those three markets, but the benefits to the
millions of customers the Bank of New England served in
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine far outweighed the limited
harm to the few residents in the Maine markets. The convenience
and needs defense was adopted when geographic limits on banks
were the norm and transactions simply were incapable of benefiting
as many people as they are today when geographic limits have been
eliminated on all holding company acquisitions.
If faced with this kind of problem, I would advise a banking
agency to follow its conscience and its view of where the public
interest lay. If the matter was litigated, the agency might lose." I
prefer, however, arguing on the side of the angels.
VI. CONCLUSION

There are many issues involved in geographic market
determination. However, I have attempted to provide a useful
introduction to the field by discussing several of the significant
issues in this Article. First, I provided an overview of the
competitive analysis of bank mergers. Second, I showed the
importance of geographic market determination in considering
whether a merger is likely to eliminate a substantial amount of actual
competition between the merging parties. Third, I discussed how the
banking agencies and the DOJ make this determination. Fourth, I
briefly discussed a "unilateral effects" analysis that could do away
with the need for geographic market determination in some
circumstances. Finally, I argued that a banking agency should be
59. Fleet/Norstar Financial Croup, Inc., 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 750 (1991).
60. The "fix-it-first" approach taken by the Fed and the DOJ means that these kinds of
issues are never litigated. In the actual Fleet case, for example, Fleet agreed to divest a
small number of offices in the three markets, which constituted a small percent of the assets

it was acquiring. Whether this kind of approach, which tends to assure that the DOJ's
positions never get litigated, is in the interest of the public or the banking industry, is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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able to offset convenience and needs considerations in one market
against anticompetitive effects in another.

